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Abstract:
Surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases is essential for polio 
eradication. However, as most poliovirus infections are asymptomatic 
and some regions of the world are inaccessible additional surveillance 
tools require development. Within England and Wales we demonstrate 
how inclusion of environmental sampling (ENV) improves the sensitivity 
of detecting either wild or vaccine derived polioviruses (VDPVs) when 
compared to current surveillance. Statistical modelling was used to 
estimate the spatial risk of wild and VDPV importation and circulation in 
England and Wales. We estimate the sensitivity of each surveillance 
mode to detect poliovirus and the probability of being free from 
poliovirus, defined as being below a pre-specified prevalence of infection. 
Poliovirus risk was higher within local authorities in Manchester, 
Birmingham, Bradford and London. The sensitivity of detecting wild 
poliovirus within a given month using AFP and enterovirus surveillance 
was estimated to be 0.096 (95% CI 0.055, 0.134). Inclusion of ENV in 
the 3 highest risk local authorities and a site in London increased 
surveillance sensitivity to 0.192 (95% CI 0.191 0.193). The sensitivity of 
ENV strategies can be compared using the framework by varying sites 
and the frequency of sampling. The probability of being free from 
poliovirus slowly increased from the date of the last case in 1993. ENV 
within areas thought to have the highest risk improves detection of 
poliovirus, and has the potential to improve confidence in the polio-free 
status of England and Wales and detect VDPVs. 
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25 Common to many European countries, England and Wales remain at risk of poliovirus 
26 importations and must continue to carry out surveillance in the pre-eradication era. 
27 Within England and Wales we demonstrate how inclusion of environmental sampling 
28 (ENV) improves the sensitivity of detecting either wild or vaccine derived polioviruses 
29 (VDPVs) when compared to current surveillance. Statistical modelling was used to 
30 estimate the spatial risk of wild and VDPV importation and circulation in England and 
31 Wales. We estimate the sensitivity of each surveillance mode to detect poliovirus and 
32 the probability of being free from poliovirus, defined as being below a pre-specified 
33 prevalence of infection. Poliovirus risk was higher within local authorities in 
34 Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford and London. The sensitivity of detecting wild 
35 poliovirus within a given month using acute flaccid paralysisAFP and enterovirus 
36 surveillance was estimated to be 0.096 (95% CI 0.0557, 0.1340). Inclusion of ENV in 
37 the 3 highest risk local authorities and a site in London increased surveillance 
38 sensitivity to 0.270 192 (95% CI 0.191239 0.301193). The sensitivity of ENV strategies 
39 can be compared using the framework by varying sites and the frequency of sampling. 
40 ENV placed within areas of high risk improves detection of poliovirus, and makes best 
41 use of the intensive sampling technique required. 
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44 Surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases is essential for polio eradication. 
45 However, as most poliovirus infections are asymptomatic and some regions of the 
46 world are inaccessible additional surveillance tools require development. Within 
47 England and Wales we demonstrate how inclusion of environmental sampling (ENV) 
48 improves the sensitivity of detecting either wild or vaccine derived polioviruses 
49 (VDPVs) when compared to current surveillance. Statistical modelling was used to 
50 estimate the spatial risk of wild and VDPV importation and circulation in England and 
51 Wales. We estimate the sensitivity of each surveillance mode to detect poliovirus and 
52 the probability of being free from poliovirus, defined as being below a pre-specified 
53 prevalence of infection. Poliovirus risk was higher within local authorities in 
54 Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford and London. The sensitivity of detecting wild 
55 poliovirus within a given month using AFP and enterovirus surveillance was estimated 
56 to be 0.096 (95% CI 0.0557, 0.1340). Inclusion of ENV in the 3 highest risk local 
57 authorities and a site in London increased surveillance sensitivity to 0.192270 (95% 
58 CI 0.191239 0.193301). The sensitivity of ENV strategies can be compared using the 
59 framework by varying sites and the frequency of sampling. The probability of being 
60 free from poliovirus slowly increased from the date of the last case in 1993 and 
61 illustrated the added value of enhanced enterovirus surveillance in the 1990s. ENV 
62 within areas thought to have the highest risk improves detection of poliovirus, and has 
63 the potential to improve confidence in the polio-free status of England and Wales and 
64 detect VDPVs.
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67 Indigenous wild poliovirus has been not been reported within England and Wales since 
68 the 1970s [1]. The elimination of poliomyelitis was achieved largely through 
69 vaccination of children and adults, using both the oral and inactivated polio vaccines 
70 (OPV and IPV, respectively). The IPV was introduced in 1956 and was replaced by 
71 the OPV in 1962 where it was part of the routine immunisation programme. In 
72 20041988 the OPV was replaced by the IPV owing to the lower risk of vaccine-
73 associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) cases. After the introduction of vaccination 
74 wild poliomyelitis cases quickly reduced in number; although sporadic imported cases 
75 of wild poliomyelitis cases have been reported within England and Wales until the 
76 1980s, emphasising the need for high immunisation rates until polio is eradicated 
77 globally [2].
78
79 Across the decades from endemicity to elimination within England and Wales, 
80 surveillance for poliomyelitis has required adaptation. Global surveillance for 
81 poliomyelitis was developed in the 1990s within the Pan American Health Organization 
82 to detect cases, focussed within polio endemic settings. All cases of acute flaccid 
83 paralysis (AFP, the typical clinical presentation of poliomyelitis) in children <15 years 
84 should be investigated, and country surveillance rates have been used to determine 
85 an adequate surveillance system. AFP surveillance was instituted throughout the 
86 United Kingdom by 1991 where children <16 years of age presenting with AFP of any 
87 aetiology were investigated for poliomyelitis [1]. The reported AFP rate was ~0.38 per 
88 100,000 and ~54% of cases had at least 1 stool sample collected for virology. 
89 Approximately 58% of AFP cases were discarded as polio and diagnosed as Guillain-
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90 Barre syndrome. The comparatively low AFP reporting rate has been consistent in 
91 subsequent years and reflects reporting rates within other high-income countries in 
92 Western Europe [3]. To further support the evidence base for the polio-free status of 
93 England and Wales, enterovirus surveillance (ENT) was included as part of the 
94 poliovirus submissions in the early 2000s, where children presenting with meningitis 
95 (a rarer clinical presentation of poliovirus) were tested for the presence of enterovirus 
96 infection, including poliovirus [1]. However, AFP and ENT surveillance will only detect 
97 clinical disease and as poliovirus infection is largely asymptomatic more appropriate 
98 tools are required. Internationally, environmental sampling (ENV) for poliovirus has 
99 been very useful in providing both evidence of elimination but also in detection of small 
100 outbreaks and otherwise undetected transmission in IPV vaccinatedion populations 
101 (where IPV protects against poliomyelitis but provides little mucosal immunity against 
102 infection) [4].
103
104 As eradication draws closer, surveillance for residual transmission and early 
105 indications of new importations and emergence events becomes increasingly 
106 important [5]. Each WHO regional office is carrying out a certification process for 
107 poliomyelitis eradication, where epidemiological evidence is reviewed to ascertain the 
108 polio-free status of each country [3]. One challenge is to assess and compare the 
109 available evidence of being polio-free given the different epidemiological surveillance 
110 activities and importation risk within each country. Additionally, vaccine-derived 
111 polioviruses (VDPVs) have increased in incidence since the removal of serotype-2 
112 from OPV in 2016. VDPVs originate from the OPV vaccine but have acquired specific 
113 mutations that increase the probability of poliovirus infection resulting in paralysis, and 
114 easily spreads in unvaccinated populations. Although no VDPVs have been detected 
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115 in England and Wales, it remains essential to have sufficient surveillance to detect any 
116 importation and transmission events. 
117
118 We make the distinction between detection of wild poliovirus and vaccine-derived 
119 poliovirus (VDPVs) because wild infections now consist of only serotype 1, and a 
120 majority of VDPV infections are of serotype 2 with a lower probability of clinical 
121 disease. We assume that current surveillance activities continue and explore how 
122 introducing ENV surveillance can supplement current activities. Using a statistical 
123 framework we aimed to answer;
124 1. Where in England and Wales should ENV surveillance be implemented to 
125 optimise detection of wild-type and VDPVs?
126 2. How does ENV surveillance improve the evidence that England and Wales are 
127 free from wild-type and VDPVs?
128  
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131 Poliomyelitis cases are classified according to virus origin; wild-type poliomyelitis 
132 cases are those that have a close genetic relation to other wild-type viruses whilst 
133 vaccine-associated poliomyelitis cases have originated from the attenuated strain 
134 used in the OPV. In this analysis we consider wild-type poliovirus, which now consist 
135 only of serotype 1, and VDPVs which we assume to be of serotype 2 [6]. We do not 
136 consider vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis cases or transmission from 
137 immune-deficient VPDV shedders [7]. These considerations are in line with the 
138 England and Wales National Guidelines for Polio [8]. 
139
140 Estimating the spatial variation in the potential for poliovirus circulation in England and 
141 Wales
142
143 Poliovirus circulation is defined as the sustained circulation through several chains of 
144 transmission of either wild-type or VDPVs within a localised area of England and 
145 Wales as a result of importation of the index infection (or case). The potential for 
146 poliovirus circulation was assumed to be the combined effect of the importation rate 
147 and the probability of local virus circulation, and was estimated for each local authority 
148 (LA). We assume that poliovirus importation varies spatially within England and Wales 
149 according to localised international migration. Importation will be driven by 
150 international travel; either residents acquiring poliovirus while abroad or through the 
151 arrival of international visitors. While the numbers of residents travelling internationally 
152 and the number of visitors is well documented at a country level, the sub-national 
153 location of both of these groups is not adequately reported. We make a simplifying 
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154 assumption that the location of foreign-born nationals approximates the location of 
155 residents visiting countries and for visitors from each country. We focus on residents 
156 from countries that have reported either wild-type or VDPVs between 2015-2017 
157 (Table 1). 
158
159 Data on the locality of foreign-born nationals are available from census data [9]. These 
160 data are reported at a local authority (LA) level, consisting of 326 geographical units 
161 within England and 22 within Wales (348 in total). The travel patterns of UK residents 
162 and visitors to the UK are available from the International Passenger Survey (IPS) 
163 [10]. Only data for residents and visitors to Pakistan and India were available with 
164 sufficient accuracy, the remaining countries were grouped with other countries within 
165 a geographical region (West Africa, South East Asia, Middle East) and the numbers 
166 were adjusted according to the proportion of the region that reside in each country.
167
168 The probability of local poliovirus circulation (herein referred to as poliovirus 
169 circulation) was estimated. We assumed that for each LA the probability of circulation 
170 follows a binomial model with exposure being the number of movements between 
171 England and Wales and each country and the probability of circulation given 
172 introduction (supplement). Since 2004 the IPV vaccine was included in the routine 
173 immunisation schedule, as part of the ‘pentavalent’ vaccine, and the OPV was phased 
174 out. Circulation given introduction is a function of the assumed basic reproduction 
175 number and local pentavalent coverage (which includes the inactivated polio vaccine). 
176 For LAs estimated to have a higher poliovirus risk the relevant water company and, 
177 where possible, the likely sewage treatment works that would need to be sampled are 
178 provided.
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180 Estimating the probability of being free from poliovirus using surveillance data
181
182 Being ‘free’ from poliovirus is a distinct concept from elimination or eradication. 
183 Elimination is defined as the reduction to zero of the incidence of a specified disease 
184 in a defined geographical area and eradication is the permanent global reduction to 
185 zero of the incidence of infection. Being free from poliovirus refers to the incidence of 
186 infection being below a pre-specified threshold, and the threshold is informed by 
187 globally accepted indicators of surveillance. Whilst elimination was confirmed in 
188 England and Wales in the 1970s, surveillance is required to detect the re-emergence 
189 of polio should it be re-introduced. Comparison of different modes and efforts of 
190 surveillance can be subjective, and so to quantify the quality of evidence from 
191 surveillance, we estimate the probability of freedom from poliovirus [10].
192
193 We follow methods that have largely been developed in animal health [11, 124]. The 
194 population is divided into LAs and the surveillance system is divided into its constituent 
195 modes of surveillance (Figure 1). We then determine a ‘design prevalence’, which is 
196 the prevalence of infection that the surveillance system is designed to detect. We use 
197 the standard surveillance indicator within polio eradication of 1 AFP case (all causes) 
198 per 100,000 individuals aged less than 15 years per year. As infection is likely to 
199 cluster (especially if an epidemic occurs), we include this by specifying the regional 
200 design prevalence of detecting at least 1 LA with poliovirus at the specified design 
201 prevalence. The combined effect of risk and design prevalence is included in the 
202 ‘effective probability of infection’ [12]. Each mode of surveillance (AFP, ENT and ENV) 
203 is then characterised by considering the sensitivity of detection at each stage of 
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204 sampling. Each is briefly described in turn below, and parameter values summarised 
205 in Table 2, and described in full in the supplement.
206
207 For AFP surveillance, the sensitivity is a product of the probability that an individual 
208 infected with poliovirus will develop symptoms consistent with AFP, which varies by 
209 serotype, the probability that an AFP case is admitted to a hospital and notified, and 
210 the probability that the case is correctly identified as poliomyelitis through collection 
211 and isolation of poliovirus in stool. This is summarised using the surveillance sensitivity 
212 per month ( ).𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐴𝐹𝑃
213
214 ENT surveillance arises from investigation of individuals accessing healthcare who are 
215 symptomatic and from whom an enterovirus-positive specimen has been obtained. All 
216 NHS laboratories are requested to submit enterovirus-positive specimens for 
217 surveillance of poliovirus. ENT surveillance captures different clinical presentations, 
218 many of which are viral meningitis [13]. For infection with poliovirus, meningitis can 
219 occur in approximately 1% of clinical cases [14], with no available data on variation by 
220 serotype. In the model we assume the notification rate is as high as for presentation 
221 with AFP. A majority of clinical samples collected by ENT surveillance consist of either 
222 stool, which has good sensitivity to detect poliovirus [13], or cerebral spinal fluid 
223 samples where the sensitivity of detecting enteroviruses is lower. Between 2000-2011 
224 in the UK clinical samples to detect enterovirus infections included 5032 cerebrospinal 
225 fluid samples and 2394 gastrointestinal samples (that are most likely stool samples) 
226 [15], where 43% of all enterovirus infections were detected via gastrointestinal 
227 samples.   PCR is usually carried out on clinical specimens which has been 
228 demonstrated to be a useful method in detection of enterovirus RNA in these sample 
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229 types [1516]. Where enterovirus RNA is detected, further laboratory investigations will 
230 aim to rule out poliovirus as the causative agent. To account for the variable sensitivity 
231 of cerebrospinal and stool samples the sensitivity of individual clinical samples is 
232 assumed to have a lower confidence bound when compared to AFP surveillance 
233 (where all clinical samples are stool). In the model the sensitivity of ENT surveillance 
234 over a period of one month is .𝐶𝑆𝑒ENT
235
236 ENV surveillance is included in the framework by specifying whether each LA includes 
237 ENV. For those LAs with no ENV the sensitivity of ENV to detect poliovirus is zero. As 
238 ENV surveillance is under development in England and Wales we vary the frequency 
239 and location of ENV to explore the effect on surveillance sensitivity. The sensitivity of 
240 a sample is assumed to depend on the proportion of residents included in the sewage 
241 catchment, the probability that a sample contains poliovirus if an individual is shedding 
242 and the laboratory sensitivity which is thought to be high [17]. The sensitivity of AFP 
243 surveillance over a period of one month is .𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑁𝑉
244  
245 The combined surveillance sensitivity of the system is calculated; 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑒 = 1 ― (1 ―
246 . Using the principal of the negative predictive value 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐴𝐹𝑃)(1 ― 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑁𝑇)(1 ― 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑁𝑉)
247 of a test, the probability of being infection free within a given month can be calculated. 
248 The probability of being polio free was then estimated for each month from January 
249 1993 to present day, with the addition of ENT surveillance in 1997, and assuming ENV 
250 in 2019. All the analysis was carried out in the software R (version 3.6.1.) and the code 
251 to replicate the analysis is available (https://github.com/kath-o-reilly/polio-FFI-UK).
252
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255 Spatial estimates of poliovirus risk in England and Wales
256
257 Between 2015 and 2017 Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria reported cases of wild-
258 type poliomyelitis while Pakistan, Nigeria, Madagascar, Laos, DR Congo, Syria, 
259 Guinea and Myanmar reported cases of VDPVs. Within Pakistan and Nigeria, more 
260 visits were made by residents of England and Wales to the country than visitors from 
261 each country (Table 1). For Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria a majority of visitors 
262 were visiting friends and relatives, supporting the assumption that their location will 
263 correlate with the location of foreign-born nationals. 
264
265 Within England and Wales the locality of long and short term residents born outside of 
266 England and Wales varies spatially and are often focussed within cities and associated 
267 conurbations, especially Birmingham, Bradford, London, and Manchester. Coverage 
268 of the pentavalent vaccine varies across England and Wales, with an average of 
269 96.3% per LA (supplement). The LAs where foreign-born nationals are frequently 
270 located are often correlated with areas that report low pentavalent coverage. When 
271 combining these data together to estimate the probability of poliovirus circulation 21 
272 LAs comprise of over 50% of the estimated risk and several of these LAs are located 
273 within cities including Manchester, Birmingham and Greater London (Figure 2 and 
274 Table 3). Consequently, if ENV sampling were targeted within catchment areas that 
275 cover these LAs, this would be an efficient form of targeted surveillance. 
276
277 Estimating the probability of being poliovirus free from surveillance data
Page 13 of 37
































































279 Detection of poliovirus through clinical surveillance – which is implemented in England 
280 and Wales - is low as clinical disease is a minority of infections. The probability of 
281 detecting one infection from clinical surveillance (the combined use of AFP and ENT 
282 surveillance) is estimated to be 0.003245 (95% CI 0.0017783 0.0048179) for wild-type 
283 poliovirus and 0.00033669 (95% CI 0.00016075 0.000641) for VDPVs. The freedom 
284 from infection model uses these values along withwith estimates of the risk of 
285 poliovirus circulation within each LAs to estimate the sensitivity of each mode of 
286 surveillance per month. Using the information available on sampling sensitivity and 
287 surveillance activities within England and Wales, the sensitivity of detecting wild-type 
288 poliovirus using AFP and ENT surveillance at the specified design prevalence within 
289 a given month was estimated to be 0.096 (95% CI 0.0557 0.1340), and lower for VDPV 
290 (0.011120 with 95% CI 0.00538 0.0210).
291  
292 We explore several scenarios for the use of ENV in England and Wales. ENV 
293 surveillance has a differing profile to clinical surveillance as it is highly sensitive where 
294 it is implemented but is limited by the size of the sewage catchment area included in 
295 sampling. Implementing monthly ENV in Birmingham, Manchester and Bradford (the 
296 LAs with highest risk of importation and circulation, strategy A (Table 3)) the sensitivity 
297 of ENV ( ) is estimated to be 0.0868 (95% CI 0.0867, 0.0869). Sampling in the 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑁𝑉
298 three high risk sites and Beckton (strategy BLondon) has an estimated sensitivity of 
299 0.192 (95% CI 0.191, 0.193). Performing fortnightly instead of monthly sampling in the 
300 same sites would result in only a moderate increase in sensitivity despite a doubling 
301 of samples. ENV surveillance capturing LAs that comprise 50% of the total risk 
302 (strategy C) would correspond to an estimated sensitivity of 0.32 (95% CI 0.31, 0.33), 
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303 and would consist of 10 ENV samples per month. Including monthly ENV surveillance 
304 within Birmingham, Manchester and Bradford would increase the total sensitivity of 
305 detecting wild-type poliovirus to 0.174 (95% CI 0.139 0.209) and with the addition of 
306 Beckton (London) the sensitivity would increase to 0.270 (95% CI 0.239 0.301), with 
307 slightly lower values for VDPV surveillance.   
308
309 We then estimate of the probability that England and Wales was free from wild-type 
310 poliovirus, given the operating surveillance and the absence of cases or infections, 
311 from 1993 to present day. The probability of being poliovirus free increases over time 
312 from the date of the last reported case of poliomyelitis in England and Wales in 1993. 
313 The introduction of ENT surveillance in 1997 was estimated to moderately improve 
314 the rate of increase in the probability of being free from poliovirus due to the higher 
315 sensitivity (Figure 3). There was no noticeable difference in the temporal change in 
316 probabilities when different importation risks were assumed or when using the 
317 population movements from IPS data versus assuming a constant importation rate. 
318 Inclusion of ENV into the estimates for the latter years would not change the estimates 
319 of England and Wales being polio free, largely because the estimates are already 
320 above 99.9%. A comparison of VDPV is also shown, but it is noted that VDPVs have 
321 never been reported in England and Wales. The lower sensitivity of surveillance 
322 means that the probability of being infection free increases but at a lower rate. 
323 Inclusion of ENV in surveillance improves sensitivity to detect VDPVs, meaning that 
324 surveillance will also improve detection of introduced VDPVs.
325
Page 15 of 37

































































328 In the final stages of polio eradication, surveillance for circulation of polioviruses 
329 remains essential. The practicalities of surveillance are becoming increasingly 
330 challenging owing to the reduced incidence of disease, an increase in the variety of 
331 risks that need to be considered and an increasingly connected world that potentially 
332 increases risk through population movement. The findings presented here illustrate 
333 the potential weaknesses of using clinical surveillance alone to detect poliovirus in 
334 England and Wales, and the added benefits of incorporating ENV. Using ENV in an 
335 informed, targeted manner has the potential to greatly enhance surveillance for 
336 polioviruses, thus expedite detection of importation events.
337
338 The approach described here assumes that spatial variation in risk within England and 
339 Wales can be quantified using data and used to inform where ENV should be targeted 
340 to maximise detection. To the authors knowledge this is the first attempt to quantify 
341 the spatial variation in poliovirus risk within a polio-free setting. Use of spatial risk 
342 mapping helps prioritize ENV sampling according to risk and estimation of surveillance 
343 sensitivity enable comparison of sampling strategies. This has been especially useful 
344 in developing the poliovirus environmental sampling strategy within England and 
345 Wales. Sampling sewage from the highest risk LAs targets surveillance within areas 
346 most likely to be exposed to poliovirus, and sampling within a large London sewage 
347 treatment works is advantageous as it covers a considerable proportion of the 
348 population with just one ENV sample. Within a pilot scheme implemented between 
349 2016-2017 Sabin poliovirus was detected in several samples, illustrating that 
350 poliovirus can be detected within a large sewage plant [1617]. Sampling in more sites 
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351 largely out-performs more frequent sampling in the same sites, but may be sensitive 
352 to our assumptions on the duration of poliovirus shedding.
353  
354 Much of the spatial variation in risk is due to movements between England and Wales 
355 and countries that have or are currently reporting wild-type and VDPV poliomyelitis 
356 cases. We assume that migration at a LA level is similar to the location of foreign-born 
357 nationals within the census. Data from IPS supports this assumption, as most 
358 residents report visiting friends and family when visiting Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
359 Nigeria. There are less data to quantify movements from Laos, DR Congo, Guinea, 
360 Myanmar and Syria, which have all reported poliomyelitis cases in recent years. With 
361 the emergence of VDPVs in Africa the risk of importation is likely to have only 
362 increased marginally due to the low number of movements between here and England 
363 and Wales. Should the incidence of VDPVs increase in Asia (and especially Pakistan 
364 which has both ongoing wild-type and VDPV transmission, and much more travel to 
365 England and Wales) the risk of importation into the UK England and Wales will further 
366 increase due to many more movements between the UK and Asia. As VDPVs have a 
367 lower symptomatic rate the addition of ENV to clinical surveillance becomes even 
368 more important. Vaccination coverage within LAs influences the likelihood of virus 
369 circulation, and ensuring that coverage remains above 90% across communities 
370 remains essential. It is therefore a concern that some LAs, especially in London 
371 boroughs, consistently report coverage below this value and these are often the same 
372 LAs with a higher proportion of foreign-born residents. Risk factors associated with 
373 low pentavalent coverage have not been specifically explored in England and Wales, 
374 but studies for other vaccines suggest that ethnicity and socio-economic factors are 
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375 associated with lower coverage [1718]. Strategies to improve vaccination rates within 
376 these underserved communities should therefore be prioritised.  
377   
378 Estimates of the probability of being infection free are moderately sensitive to 
379 assumptions on the probability of importation, which remain uncertain within England 
380 and Wales. Visitors to countries that are at risk of poliovirus are recommended to 
381 receive a booster of IPV/pentavalent vaccine, and visitors from at-risk countries are 
382 required to provide evidence of recent vaccination history as part of the continued 
383 Public Health Emergency of International Concern for poliomyelitis. Visitors to Saudi 
384 Arabia, as part of religious pilgrimages (Hajj or Umrah) are recommended to receive 
385 vaccinations [1819]. Consequently, substantial efforts are put in place to reduce the 
386 risk of poliovirus importations to England and Wales, but the risk remains, as illustrated 
387 by recent importation events within other high income countries [1920, 2021].
388
389 There are several caveats to the analysis that may warrant further research. We have 
390 not considered the risks associated with laboratory release, which are currently 
391 considered low, but the relative risks associated with Polio Essential Facilities located 
392 in England and Wales will increase as polio eradication approaches the post-
393 certification phase [2122]. We do not consider the risks associated with transmission 
394 of polioviruses from immune-compromised individuals shedding iVDPVs; despite 
395 intensive study there has only been a small handful of transmission events recorded 
396 and there is only one reported individual within the UK known to shed iVDPV [2223]. 
397 Further exploration of ENT surveillance for detecting polioviruses is warranted, as 
398 current stool sampling is limited even though the sensitivity of detection is high and 
399 the sampling is non-invasive. Populations of unvaccinated adults may pose a risk 
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400 within specific geographical communities but currently there is little information to rely 
401 on. Further details of catchment areas will be needed to select suitable sampling sites 
402 and this requires collaboration with water companies. Additionally, the precise 
403 sensitivity of an ENV sample is dependent on many factors not considered in the 
404 model but described elsewhere [2324]. Instead, we included a large range of 
405 uncertainty and took this decision because of the lack of data to inform calculations 
406 but this can be revisited should the data become available. The specified design 
407 prevalence affects the estimates of sensitivity and as eradication approaches a more 
408 stringent design prevalence may be warranted. Methodological developments may be 
409 required to validate the approach, such as simulation. With these caveats in mind, it 
410 should be noted that the exact risk probabilities may be uncertain but the relative 




415 Surveillance for poliovirus is becoming increasingly complex owning to the different 
416 modes of surveillance, and the changing risk of poliomyelitis. This research is the first 
417 attempts to quantify the variation in poliovirus risk in a disease-free setting, and use of 
418 these estimates to compare different modes of surveillance. ENV surveillance will 
419 improve the sensitivity of surveillance, thus supporting the certification phase of polio 
420 eradication.
421
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Tables and Figures for “Surveillance Optimization to Detect Poliovirus in 
the Pre-Eradication Era: a Modelling Study of England and Wales”
Table 1. Countries that have reported either wild of VDPVs between 2015-2017 and the reported number of movements 




































Afghanistan 34.6 47 0.45 0 0 0.45 ND 15,351
Pakistan 193.2 82 0.14 3 0.01 0.15 65,776 552,833
Nigeria 186 4 0.01 2 0 0.01 100,904 183,807
Madagascar 24.9 0 0 10 0.13 0.13 ND 8,289
Laos 6.8 0 0 11 0.54 0.54 ND 3,032
DRC 78.7 0 0 22 0.09 0.09 ND ND
Syria 18.4 0 0 74 1.34 1.34 ND ND
Guinea 12.1 0 0 7 0.19 0.19 ND ND
Myanmar 52.9 0 0 2 0.01 0.01 ND 15,287
ND – no data, presumed to be very low
Table 2. Estimates of surveillance probabilities used in the scenario tree analysis. The rationale behind the selected 
values are described in more detail in the Supplementary Material.
Surveillance AFP ENT ENV
Model inputs
Probability Estimate (95% CI) Probability Estimate (95% 
CI)
Probability Estimate (95% 
CI)











Notification Pr(notifAFP) 0.9 (0.6, 0.99) Pr(notifENT) 0.9 (0.6, 0.99) Pr(catchment) varied
Sampling Pr(sampleAFP
)
0.8 (0.5, 0.95) Pr(sampleENT) 0.5 (0.1, 0.9) Pr(sample) 0.80 (0.5, 0.90)1 
Test Pr(testAFP) 0.97 (0.95, 1.00) Pr(testENT) 0.97 (0.95, 1.00) Pr(testENV) 0.97 (0.95, 
1.00)
1 Monthly sampling
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Table 3. Summary of the Local Authorities that constitute over 50% of the estimated risk of poliovirus circulation in 
England and Wales. The parentheses A, B, and C refer to the ENV sampling strategies described in the results.





























97.2 Yorkshire Water - 
Esholt
0.947 4.6% 522,452
Newham (B) London 
Borough
94.2* Thames Water - 
Beckton
0.896 3.8% 307,984
Redbridge (B) London 
Borough
95.2* Thames Water - 
Beckton
0.912 2.6% 278,970
Ealing (C) London 
Borough
95.9* Thames Water - 
Mogden
0.923 2.4% 338,449









92.1* Thames Water - 
Beckton
0.864 2.2% 258,249
Luton  (C) Luton 96.3 Thames Water 0.932 1.9% 203,201
City of 
Nottingham  (C) 
Nottingham 94.7* Severn Trent – 
Stoke Bardolph
0.904 1.9% 305,680
Hounslow  (C) London 
Borough
89.7* Thames Water - 
Mogden
0.830 1.9% 253,957
Brent  (C) London 
Borough
93.1* Thames Water - 
Mogden
0.879 1.8% 311,215




96.2 Yorkshire Water 0.929 1.5% 552,698
Slough (C) Outer 
London
94.5* Thames Water 0.901 1.5% 140,205
Hillingdon  (C) London 
Borough












Wales 95.0* Glas Cymru 0.909 1.4% 346,090




98.1 Yorkshire Water 0.963 1.3% 422,458
Barnet (C) London 
Borough
92.1* Thames Water - 
Mogden
0.864 1.3% 356,386
Greenwich  (C) London 
Borough







90.5* Thames Water - 
Beckton
0.840 1.2% 185,911
1 Starred LAs indicate that the pentavalent coverage is below the national average. 2Where possible the likely sewage 
treatment works is given.
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Figure 1. Scenario tree structure for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), enterovirus (ENT) and 
environmental (ENV) surveillance in England and Wales. Dashed circles indicate category nodes, 
squares indicate infection nodes, circles indicate detection nodes and hexagons indicate outcome 
nodes.
Figure 2. Estimated risk of poliovirus circulation in local authorities within A) England and Wales, 
and B) London. C) The estimated risk within each local authority is ordered by reducing risk and 
compared to the cumulative percentage of the population to illustrate that 50% of estimated risk is 
focussed within <20% of the population. 
Figure 3. Estimates of the probability of being poliovirus free within England and Wales. The dark 
brown line is the median estimate and the lighter brown lines are the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile 
estimates. The arrow indicates when enterovirus surveillance was introduced. The dashed line 
indicates a 0.95 probability, which was reached by early 1996 for the wild virus analysis (VDPV is 
shown as a comparator). 
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Supplementary Material for “Surveillance Optimization to Detect Poliovirus in the 
Pre-Eradication Era: a Modelling Study of England and Wales”
1. Vaccination coverage of the pentavalent vaccine
Figure 1. Average pentavalent coverage in children under 5 years of age by Local Authority within A) England and Wales and B) London Boroughs, 
2011-2016. Local authorities that report coverage below 90% are highlighted.
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2. Water companies and likely sewage treatment works serving high risk local 
authorities
Severn Trent water company
Severn Trent water company serves cities such as Birmingham, Nottingham, Leicester and 
Wolverhampton, as described on their website 
(https://www.severntrent.com/content/dam/stw-plc/water-resource-zones/WRMP-main-
narrative.a.pdf). Minworth sewage treatment works (in Sutton Coldfield) serves the area of 
Birmingham City. The sewage treatment works of Stoke Bardolph is the likely treatment works 
that serves the Nottingham area.
United Utilities
The Greater Manchester area is served by United Utilities 
(https://www.unitedutilities.com/help-and-support/wastewater-services/). The treatment 
works that serves most of the Manchester are is the Davyhulme treatment works. 
Yorkshire Water
Yorkshire water serves Bradford, with Esholt treatment works being the main sewage treatment 
for this area (https://www.yorkshirewater.com/waste-water-treatment-services/). For Leeds, 
the likely sewage treatment facility is Knostrop Wastewater Treatment Works. For Sheffield 
the likely sewage treatment works is Woodhouse Mill Sewage Treatment Works. 
Thames Water
Thames water is the company that serves the Greater London area and some additional counties 
surrounding London. There are three main sewage treatment works; Beckton, Crossness and 
Mogden. The catchment of these treatment works has been well described by Thames Water 
(see figure), and can be used to approximate which would be sampled if carrying out 
surveillance of each population within the Local Authority.
Glas Cymru
Glas Cymru is the water treatment company for Wales. The likely sewage treatment works for 
Cardiff is Llwyn Onn Sewage Works.
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Figure 2. Converging sewer network of Great London overlaid onto the London Boroughs (from Thames Water).
3. Estimation of the spatial variation in the potential for poliovirus circulation in 
England and Wales
The probability of local poliovirus circulation (herein referred to as poliovirus circulation) is 
estimated. Within this context we are interested in circulation that may result in a poliomyelitis 
case. The basic reproduction number (R0 - the average number of secondary cases from one 
infected person within a totally susceptible population) is useful measure of transmissibility of 
an infectious disease. When R0 is greater than 1 the introduction of an infected individual may 
result in a large outbreak and if R0<1 a large outbreak is unlikely. For vaccines with sterilizing 
immunity the probability of a major epidemic is given by s=  where  refers 1 ― 1 (𝑅0(1 ― 𝑐)) 𝑐
to the proportion of the population immunised. Rather than sterilising immunity, the IPV 
(which is part of the pentavalent vaccine) reduces the infectiousness and duration of 
infectiousness of immunised individuals,1  so the probability of a major epidemic requires some 
adaptation;  where  is the relative infectiousness of 𝑠 = 1 ― 1 (𝑅0((1 ― 𝑐) + 𝑐ℎ𝑑)) ℎ
immunised individuals and  is the relative change in the duration of infectiousness.𝑑
The probability of major epidemic was estimated for each LA in England and Wales. To 
estimate the potential for poliovirus circulation the probability of circulation and the number 
of importation events ( ) are combined assuming a binomial process. The risk for LA 𝑀𝑗
 was estimated by summing over all locations considered to be a potential source 𝑖 {𝑖 = 1,…,𝑁}
(j);
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.                                                                                    equation 2.1𝑅𝑖 = 1 ― ∑
𝑁
𝑗 = 1(1 ― 𝑠𝑖)
𝑀𝑗
For ENV surveillance in England and Wales to be optimised, sampling should be prioritised 
within sewage catchment areas with LAs with the highest risk. Wastewater treatment in 
England and Wales consists of eleven companies that manage regions similar to counties. 
Analysis of the spatial variation in poliovirus risk does not fully align with the location of 
sewage catchment areas but we provide an indication of the LAs and corresponding water 
company, and where possible the sewage treatment works that should be sampled to capture 
wastewater from each LA. The risk of poliovirus circulation is assumed to vary between wild 
and VDPVs based on just the location of reported cases and migration between England and 
Wales and these countries.
The estimated number of importations of either wild or VDPV poliovirus (M) is a function of 
the number of number of visitors to (N(i,j)) and from each country (N(j,i)), their vaccination 
status (v(i) and v(j)), and the incidence of WPV and VDPVs within each country. 
               equation 2.2𝑀𝑊𝑃𝑉(j) = N(i,j).𝐼𝑊𝑃𝑉(j).(1 ― ν(i)) + N(j,i).𝐼𝑊𝑃𝑉(j).(1 ― ν(j))
            equation 2.3𝑀𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑉(j) = N(i,j).𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑉(j).(1 ― ν(i)) + N(j,i).𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑉(j).(1 ― ν(j))
The total number of movements are .𝑀𝑗 = 𝑀𝑊𝑃𝑉,𝑗 + 𝑀𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑉,𝑗
4. Estimation of surveillance sensitivity
The methods for estimating the sensitivity of each mode of surveillance are first described. 
For one poliovirus infection the sensitivity of detection through AFP surveillance (SeUAFP) is 
estimated by taking the product of each step in the detection pathway (ie. from the probability 
of an infection being symptomatic through to the probability of the diagnostic test being 
positive, see Figure 1). If the risk of infection is constant across all locations, the estimate of 
sensitivity remains relatively simple. However, if the risk of infection varies across settings, it 
is intuitive that sampling within high risk settings would be preferable to sampling in low risk 
settings, and so the sensitivity needs to be adjusted. Acknowledging that this adjustment is an 
approximation,2 we can use estimates of relative risks. The effective probability of infection 
(EPI) is used to account for variation in poliovirus risk across the LAs. The EPI combines the 
adjusted risk and the herd prevalence, . The relative risks (RR), estimated in the 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑖 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖.𝑃 ∗ℎ
previous section, and the proportion of the population (PrP) are used to calculate the adjusted 
risk (AR), by solving the simultaneous equations;





 .                                                    equation 3.2AR1.PrP1 +… + ARn.PrPn = 1
High risk LAs will have an adjusted risk above 1.00 and consequently increased surveillance 
within these settings would have a more rapid improvement in the sensitivity of the entire 
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system. Combining these elements together, the sensitivity of detection through AFP 
surveillance is;
SeUAFP,i = 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑖.Pr (caseAFP).Pr (notificationAFP).Pr (sampleAFP).Pr(testAFP)
To calculate the sensitivity of AFP within each LA in a given month (SSeAFP,i), we assume that 
all individuals (n) within each LA are included in surveillance;
CSeAFP,i = 1 ― (1 ― SeUAFP,i)𝑛𝑖
Similar calculations are done for enterovirus (CSeENT,i) and environmental surveillance 
(CSeENV,i). All probabilities include uncertainty which is carried through the calculations and 
the mean and 95% credible intervals are given. See section 5 for a description of how estimates 
for each element of surveillance were derived.
We then want to estimate the sensitivity across the entire system for each mode of surveillance. 
First we need to combine estimates LAs for each surveillance system;





Then these values are used to estimate the surveillance sensitivity of the entire system; 
. 𝐶𝑆𝑒 = 1 ― ((1 ― 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐴𝐹𝑃)(1 ― 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑁𝑇)(1 ― 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑁𝑉))
As with other high-income countries sewage collects into a catchment area so maps from water 
companies can be used to determine the extent of population coverage if ENV is initiated at a 
specific sewage works. Composite samples are taken from the inlet of the sewage works and 
previous research suggests they have a high sensitivity to poliovirus if an individual is shedding 
within the last week.3 Shedding studies have illustrated a high sensitivity of detecting 
poliovirus from just one composite sample and so the sensitivity of ENV is largely influenced 
by the frequency of sampling. If an individual sheds poliovirus for approximately 16 days,3 
poliovirus could be detected within sewage for up to 23 days from one individual, resulting in 
a monthly sampling frequency corresponding to a detection probability of (23+1)/30=0.80. The 
duration of shedding in IPV vaccinated individuals is lower,1 but if more than one individual 
is shedding poliovirus the probability of detection would increase. To account for the known 
variation in shedding and uncertainty in the number of shedders the probability of detection is 
given wide confidence intervals and monte-carlo simulation is used to sample from these 
distributions (Table 3). Fortnightly sampling within one location would increase the detection 
probability to 1.00. Sensitivity of detection is thought to reduce with increasing sewage flow4 
and so sensitivity may be lower in sewage sites processing wastewater from a large (>100,000) 
population, but empirical studies that test this are lacking.
5. Estimation of the probability of being polio-free
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Using the principal of the negative predictive value of a test, and assuming that testing has 
100% specificity, the probability of being infection free within a given month (t) is 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡) =
, where P is the prior for being infected and  refers to diagnostic (1 ― 𝑃) (1 ― 𝑃.𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝑒
sensitivity, which in this case is the sensitivity of the surveillance system. Each prior 
probability is the  for the previous time period, which is a combination of being free 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡)
during the previous time period and accounting for the probability of introduction. We also 
need to account for poliovirus introduction for each calendar month ( ). The 𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡)
probability of being infection free within a calendar month is then given as;
 equation 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 ― 1) = 1 ― (𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 ― 1) + 𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡 ― 1) ― 𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 ― 1).𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡 ― 1))
4.1
                                         equation 4.2𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡) = (1 ― 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 ― 1))/(1 ― 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 ― 1).𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑡
Different sampling strategies are considered for ENV surveillance. The rate of poliovirus 
introduction is unknown, consequently the rate is estimated from approximating population 
movements to and from countries reporting poliomyelitis cases and the probability of shedding. 
From the International Passenger Survey (Figure 3) we can approximate the numbers of 
individuals that travel to and from countries reporting polio cases and combine this with the 
reported incidence of wild and VDPV within each country to provide an upper estimate of the 
rate of introduction. Low (1x10-4), medium (1x10-3) and high (5x10-3) probabilities of 
poliovirus introduction per month were used to account the true value being unknown.
Figure 3. Estimates of the number of visits to and from countries that have reported poliomyelitis cases (IPS data).
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6. Justification for probabilities used in the scenario tree modelling
In most probabilities estimated below, a mean and 95% confidence intervals are provided from 
the available data. These values were inputted to the model by specifying a beta distribution 
with parameters  and . Within the software R, the specific parameter values that correspond α β
to the specified mean and 95% confidence intervals were provided using the library 
‘prevalence’.
Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) Surveillance
 Pr(caseAFP): Of individuals infected with poliovirus Nathanson et al.5 report that the 
probability of a clinical case varies by serotype; 0.005, 0.0005 and 0.0009 for serotypes 
1, 2, and 3 respectively. A beta distribution with mean 0.005 and 95% CI 0.0005-0.009 
encapsulates these estimated probabilities and the possible uncertainty in the values. As 
we estimate the sensitivity for wild poliovirus and vaccine-derived poliovirus 
separately, we use the estimates for serotype 1 and 2.
 Pr(notificationAFP): A case of AFP caused by poliovirus is an acute condition where it 
is very likely in a high income setting that healthcare will be sought. However, there is 
little data to inform this probability so we have taken precautionary principle of using 
knowledge from all cases of AFP (including Guillian-Barre syndrome) within England 
and Wales. 
 Pr(sampleAFP): Stool sampling is recommended as part of the clinical investigation of 
all AFP cases. Within Salisbury et al. 6 of 0.54 of AFP cases had stool samples. Since 
this time clinical sampling has mostly likely improved, so we select a mean of 0.8 with 
confidence intervals ranging from 0.5-0.95.
 Pr(testAFP): Samples to be tested for poliovirus undergo rigorous laboratory testing 
where PCR is used to determine the presence of enterovirus in stool, CSF or throat 
swabs. Following a positive PCR virus culture, intratypic differentiation and sequence 
analysis will be carried out as per the WHO protocol. The testing is highly sensitive 
with reported sensitivities above 0.95 for ~100 RNA copies per microlitre for ITD 5.0 
which is a similar protocol to that used in testing within England and Wales 7. We 
specify a high probability of detection with a mean of 0.97 and 95% CI of 0.95-1.00.
Enterovirus (ENT) Surveillance
 Pr(caseENT): Conditions such as aseptic meningitis are also clinical indicators of 
poliovirus infection in addition to acute flaccid myelitis. There are fewer reports of the 
probability of developing aseptic meningitis, but Salisbury et al. 6 suggest that about 
3% of case may lead to aseptic meningitis, and Mehndiratta et al estimate that 
meningitis occurs in about 1% of cases,8 although no distinction is made between 
serotype. Additionally, during a serotype 3 polio outbreak in Finland, nine cases of 
paralytic poliomyelitis were reported and one case of aseptic meningitis, which could 
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be used to suppose a 9:1 ratio of paralytic polio to aseptic meningitis.9 Confidence 
intervals 0.01-0.05 were used to account for uncertainty in this estimate.
 Pr(notificationENT): Clinical disease associated with enterovirus infection is used as a 
proxy for the notification rate that might be associated with aseptic meningitis caused 
by poliovirus infection. Estimates are not available but it is assumed that health-seeking 
behaviours would be similar to that for poliovirus infection
 Pr(sampleENT): For clinical disease associated with enterovirus infection, Majumdar et 
al. 9 provide a description of current surveillance activities and report that a large 
proportion of clinical cases have microbiological samples (stool and CSF) that would 
enable culture of poliovirus. We assume an average probability of collecting a sample 
of 0.8 with wide confidence intervals (95% CI 0.5-0.95 to account for the large 
uncertainty in the estimate.
 Pr(testENT): The microbiological protocol for clinical samples via ENT surveillance is 
the same as AFP diagnostics, so the same probabilities are used.
Environmental (ENV) Surveillance
 Pr(sheddingENV): We assume that all individuals infected with poliovirus shed 
poliovirus in stool.
 Pr(catchmentENV): As sewerage systems in England and Wales consist of a convergent 
sewer system, we can assume that all waste will eventually reach a sewage processing 
plant. Each local authority is assumed to have at most one sewage treatment plant that 
can be sampled for ENV surveillance. In many areas, for example London, one sewage 
treatment plant serves several local authorities. Within the framework, if a local 
authority is assumed to be sampled during ENV surveillance, we assume a probability 
of 0.8 that the infected individuals would be sampled (to account for time spent outside 
of the sewage catchment area).
 Pr(sampleENV): Sampling of wastewater is carried out using a composite sampler, which 
takes small samples of the wastewater over a 24 hour period 9. If an individual sheds 
poliovirus for approximately 16 days,3 poliovirus could be detected within sewage for 
up to 23 days from one individual, resulting in a monthly sampling frequency 
corresponding to a detection probability of (23+1)/30=0.80.
 Pr(testENV); The microbiological protocol for clinical samples via ENV surveillance is 
similar as AFP diagnostics, with an added concentration step (2-phase separation) 9. It 
is not thought that the concentration step reduced detection sensitivity, but the large 
amount of contamination from mixed sewage may reduce culture success of poliovirus.
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